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 NOTE 
Reconsidering Missouri’s Warrant 
Suppression Standard 
State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 2019 WL 
1231946 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019) (mem.) 
James Sanders* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The search warrant is a foundational component of the American criminal 
justice process.  Designed to limit and prevent overreach by police and other 
law enforcement entities, the framers of the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution sought to use warrants as a tool to control the scope and 
breadth of searches and seizures of private property.1  The Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirements are a vital check on the proactive and ever-grow-
ing2 police efforts of state and federal authorities. 
Law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels carry out thousands 
of search warrants every day across the United States.3  Police or other law 
enforcement personnel submit a warrant application to a judge who then re-
views the application to ensure it is supported by probable cause.4  If a warrant 
 
* B.S., Business Administration and Sports Management, Saint Louis University; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020; Note and Comment Editor, 
Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  Thanks to Professor Ben Trachtenberg for his as-
sistance throughout the research and writing process and to the editors of the Missouri 
Law Review for their comments and feedback throughout the writing and editing pro-
cess. 
 1. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1391–92 (1989). 
 2. In the aftermath of revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveil-
lance programs and government collection of American citizens’ metadata in the name 
of national security, it is an open question if – or to what extent – people are ever free 
of government scrutiny.  See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, Dystopian Constitutionalism, 
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 594–95 (2015).  American surveillance and policing are 
often compared unfavorably to totalitarian or “Orwellian” regimes.  Id. 
 3. Missouri circuit courts alone issued 216,579 warrants in fiscal year 2017, an 
average of nearly 600 warrants per day.  SUPREME COURT OF MO., MISSOURI JUDICIAL 
REPORT SUPPLEMENT 233 (2017), https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=122404. 
 4. See generally Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).  Warrants 
must be reviewed by a neutral and detached magistrate.  Id. at 449. 
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application is defective, the reviewing judge may deny the application entirely 
or strike individual portions that lack probable cause.5 
Despite the best efforts of judges who oversee the criminal investigation 
process, not every warrant perfectly conforms to the parameters of the Consti-
tution.  Considering the massive scale on which the correctional system oper-
ates,6 it is hardly surprising that errors – malicious or inadvertent – happen at 
every stage of the criminal justice process.  This fact raises important policy 
questions about what should happen when a warrant contains statements un-
supported by probable cause or extends a search beyond its permitted scope.  
These questions become particularly relevant when defective warrants are ex-
ecuted and lead to evidence vital to a prosecution. 
What should courts do when evidence is recovered under a partially in-
valid warrant?  Typically, the solution is to apply the severance doctrine.7  The 
severance doctrine permits a court to strike invalid parts of a warrant and ille-
gally seized evidence while preserving the valid portions of the warrant and 
evidence seized pursuant to it.8  In theory, severance places the prosecution and 
defendant in the positions they would have been in had the search warrant not 
been defective.  While an imperfect solution, severance attempts to balance the 
conflicting policy goals of allowing the prosecution to use its otherwise legiti-
mate evidence at trial while mitigating the harmful effects of the warrant on 
the defendant’s case. 
Most federal and state courts approach severance decisions in a generally 
uniform manner under a test developed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Sells.9  The so-called “Sells test” consists of 
five steps: 
 
(1) Divide the warrant into categories of items; 
(2) Evaluate the constitutional validity of each category; 
(3) Distinguish the valid and invalid categories; 
(4) Determine whether the valid or invalid portions make up the greater 
part of the warrant; and 
(5) Sever the invalid portions of the warrant if severance is appropriate.10 
 
A circuit split has emerged over the application of the Sells test because 
some jurisdictions have removed the greater part requirement – step four of the 
 
 5. H. MORLEY SWINGLE, SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW IN MISSOURI 84–85 (Jan. 2019 
ed.), https://semo.edu/pdf/old/LEA_SearchAndSeizureBook_2013.pdf. 
 6. See DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 1 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf.  In 2016, the incarceration rate of 
adults in the United States was 860 per 100,000.  Id. at 4. 
 7. See United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1150–51 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. at 1151. 
 10. Id. 
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test – from their analyses while others have not.11  The greater part requirement 
calls for a quantitative and qualitative balancing of the warrant: Courts add up 
the number of valid versus invalid categories and then apply qualitative weight 
to each category to determine whether the invalid categories outweigh the valid 
categories.12  If the invalid categories outweigh the valid categories, the entire 
warrant is deemed defective, and all evidence found during its execution must 
be suppressed.13  However, if the valid categories outweigh the invalid catego-
ries, the court may sever the invalid categories and preserve the rest.14 
Jurisdictions that rejected the greater part requirement of the Sells test 
have observed that the test forces judges to divide a challenged warrant into 
subjective categories first and then assign subjective qualitative values to each 
category.15  The subjectivity-on-subjectivity requirement of the Sells test ele-
vates courts’ qualitative analyses to outcome-determinative levels in warrant-
suppression cases because judges can essentially “balance” a warrant any way 
that is necessary to reach a desired result.  This framework unnecessarily intro-
duces uncertainty into the warrant suppression process and can lead to wildly 
disparate outcomes depending on the judge or jurisdiction.  State v. Douglass16 
was a case that should have been straightforward.  A victim reported stolen 
property and told the police who she suspected of stealing the property.17  The 
police searched the home of the defendants and recovered the stolen property.18  
Fortunately for the defendants, the story does not end here.  The police made 
unnecessary and unforced errors by misstating probable cause on the warrant 
application form for the defendants’ home, leading the defendants to success-
fully move to suppress all evidence recovered pursuant to the warrant.19  Over 
a six-year period, this case was heard at all three levels of the Missouri courts 
and was unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.20 
Part II of this Note will explore the facts of State v. Douglass and briefly 
discuss the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding.  Next, Part III will provide 
an overview of leading case law on the issue of partially defective warrants and 
their treatment by courts in various jurisdictions.  Part III will then contextual-
ize Douglass’ transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri by reviewing the 
 
 11. Compare Sells, 463 F.3d 1148 and United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d 
Cir. 2013) (applying the Sells test), with United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 100, 1021 
(6th Cir. 1991) (“[Courts may] sever the infirm portion of the search warrant from the 
remainder which passes constitutional muster.”). 
 12. Sells, 463 F.3d at 1151. 
 13. Id. at 1159. 
 14. Id. at 1151. 
 15. See infra notes 85–101. 
 16. 544 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 2019 WL 1231946 (U.S. 
Mar. 18, 2019) (mem.). 
 17. Id. at 187. 
 18. Id. at 188. 
 19. Id. at 188–99. 
 20. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 (No. 18-285), 
2018 WL 4275880. 
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case’s procedural history, particularly the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Western District’s six-to-five reversal of the circuit court’s suppression of the 
warrant.  Part IV will examine the Douglass majority opinion’s analysis of the 
warrant involved in this case under the Sells test.  A discussion of Chief Justice 
Zel M. Fischer’s dissent, which was joined by Judge Paul C. Wilson, will fol-
low. 
Part V will suggest that criminal defendants’ rights and the policy goals 
of law enforcement would be most effectively preserved by adopting a modi-
fication of the Sells test that removes the greater part requirement’s qualitative 
analysis may reduce uncertainty in the warrant suppression process.  Addition-
ally, Part V will suggest that the greater part requirement of the Sells test ben-
efits neither prosecutors nor defendants because the open-ended subjectivity of 
the qualitative analysis test promotes a system where suppression motions can 
reach wildly disparate outcomes in favor of either side depending on which 
judge hears the motion.  Finally, Part V will address the impact of Douglass on 
the future of fillable form search warrants and suggest some possible adjust-
ments to police policies and officer training that may prevent the kind of prob-
lems that arose in Douglass from becoming an issue in the future.  This Note’s 
ultimate conclusion is that the greater part requirement of the Sells test should 
be eliminated from future courts’ analyses. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
State v. Douglass involved the criminal prosecution of Jennifer Gaulter 
and Phillip Douglass by the State of Missouri.21  Gaulter and Douglass were 
arrested and charged under Missouri’s burglary22 and felony stealing23 statutes 
in connection with their break-in and property thefts of Melissa Garris’ home.24  
Before trial, Gaulter and Douglass moved to suppress the contents of the search 
warrant that ultimately led to their arrests because the police misrepresented 
probable cause on the warrant application.25  The circuit court granted the mo-
tion to suppress.26  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
reversed the circuit court27 but was subsequently reversed by the Supreme 
 
 21. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 187. 
 22. See MO. REV. STAT. § 569.170 (2016). 
 23. See id. § 570.030. 
 24. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 188; Motion to Suppress, Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 
(No. 1316–CR03008), 2014 WL 12539453. 
 25. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 188. 
 26. Id. 
 27. State v. Douglass, No. WD 78328, 2016 WL 1212371, at *11 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2016), rev’d by 544 S.W.3d 182, cert. denied, 2019 WL 1231946 (U.S. Mar. 
18, 2019) (mem.). 
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Court of Missouri in favor of Gaulter and Douglass.28  The State appealed to 
the Supreme Court of the United States, but the Court denied certiorari.29 
On August 21, 2013, Melissa Garris visited her acquaintances Jennifer 
Gaulter and Phillip Douglass in their room at the Argosy Casino Hotel and Spa 
in Kansas City, Missouri.30  That evening, Garris had drinks with Gaulter and 
Douglass before going home early after Gaulter and Douglass attempted to 
pressure Garris into joining them in a sex act.31  The following day, Gaulter 
texted Garris that Garris left her handbag and apartment keys behind in the 
hotel room.32  Gaulter agreed to leave the handbag and keys with the hotel’s 
front desk staff so Garris could collect them.33  Later in the day, Gaulter texted 
Garris again, asking if she was at home or working.34  Garris replied that she 
was at work.35 
When Garris arrived home from work around 6:10 p.m., she discovered 
her home in “disarray and several items of property missing.”36  Garris “imme-
diately” called the Argosy Casino to inquire about the status of her handbag 
and keys and was told the handbag was present but her keys were not.37  Garris 
sent text messages to Gaulter asking about the missing keys and break-in, but 
Gaulter did not respond.38  Garris then reported the break-in to the police and 
estimated the value of the property stolen from her home at approximately 
$10,000.39  Garris then traveled back to Argosy Casino to recover her handbag 
but was informed that someone else had already come to collect it.40  She added 
the missing handbag and keys to her police report and identified Gaulter and 
Douglass as the probable thieves.41 
Detective Darold Estes of the Kansas City Police Department subse-
quently applied for a warrant to search Douglass and Gaulter’s Blue Springs, 
Missouri, home.42  Detective Estes submitted a corresponding affidavit to the 
 
 28. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 199. 
 29. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 (No. 18-285), 
2018 WL 4275880.   
 30. Douglass, 2016 WL 1212371, at *2. 
 31. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 187. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  Among the stolen items were one Prada and two Coach purses; a Louis 
Vuitton bag; a limited-edition Toshiba laptop; custom engraved jewelry; Coach, LV, 
Hermes, and Bestie brand sunglasses; Garris’ social security card and passport; Garris’ 
son’s social security card and birth certificate; and Clinique and Mary Kay brand per-
fume and makeup.  Id. at 191. 
 40. Id. at 187. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
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circuit judge in which he stated there was probable cause to search the home 
and seize specific items believed to be Garris’ stolen property.43  The Kansas 
City Police Department used a warrant application form that included six 
“check boxes” denoting categories of items and people that Missouri law au-
thorizes the police to search for.44  The categories are: 
 Property, article, material or substance that constitutes evidence of 
the commission of a crime; 
 Property that has been stolen or acquired in any manner declared 
an offense; 
 Property for which possession is an offense under the laws of this 
state; 
 Any person for whom a valid felony arrest warrant is outstanding; 
 Deceased human fetus or corpse, or part thereof; 
 Other.45 
Detective Estes checked each of the first five boxes, leaving the box 
marked “Other” unchecked.46  Following the check boxes on the warrant ap-
plication, Detective Estes wrote the address and physical description of 
Douglass and Gaulter’s house as the “person, place or thing to be searched.”47  
The final segment of the warrant form presented the following prompt to De-
tective Estes: 
 
The property, article, material, substance or person to be searched for 
and seized is described as follows: 
Coach purse that is silver with C’s on it, a Coach purse with purple 
beading, Prada purse black in color, large Louis Vuitton bag 
Toshiba Satellite laptop limited edition silver with black swirls on it 
Vintage/costume jewelry several items had MG engraved on them 
Coach, Lv, Hermes, Bestie Sunglasses 
Passport and Social Security card ( [M.G.] ) 
 
 43. Id. at 187–88. 
 44. See id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 542.271 (2016). 
 45. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 190. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 190–91. 
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Social Security Card/Birth Certificate in son’s name ( [N.L.] ) 
Various bottles of perfume makeup brushes and Clinique and Mary Kay 
makeup sets 
Keys not belonging to property or vehicle at scene 
Any property readily and easily identifiable as stolen48 
A circuit judge approved the warrant application and Kansas City police 
executed a search on Douglass and Gaulter’s home that evening.49  The search 
recovered a laptop and case, a red purse and its contents, a Coach purse, and a 
bracelet.50  Garris identified each item as property stolen from her home.51 
Douglass and Gaulter were arrested and charged with second-degree bur-
glary and felony stealing.52  They each filed motions to suppress, challenging 
the warrant’s validity because police did not have probable cause to search for 
a “deceased human fetus or corpse, or part thereof.”53  Douglass and Gaulter 
claimed that the exclusionary rule54 completely barred all evidence seized pur-
suant to a constitutionally defective warrant.55 
In a consolidated hearing on Douglass’ and Gaulter’s motions to suppress, 
Detective Estes conceded the police did not have probable cause to search for 
human remains.56  He explained he checked the corpse clause of the search 
warrant because he believed the police would have been required to secure a 
second, “piggyback” warrant if human remains were recovered during the 
search.57  Additionally, Detective Estes stated he believed checking the box on 
the initial warrant form would save time in the event human remains were re-
covered at the scene.58  The State opposed Douglass’ and Gaulter’s motions to 
suppress, arguing the warrant’s errors fell within the good faith exception59 to 
the exclusionary rule because the searching officers reasonably relied on the 
 
 48. Id. at 191 (alteration in original). 
 49. Id. at 188. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. “The normal rule is that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in vi-
olation of the Constitution . . . is inadmissible in state court.”  State v. Grayson, 336 
S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 55. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 188. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1030 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
a detective’s good faith reliance on a defective warrant does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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warrant’s constitutional validity and did not unlawfully expand their search be-
yond the stolen property.60 
The circuit court granted the suppression motion, holding that by check-
ing the corpse clause, Detective Estes knowingly made a false statement to the 
court.61  Further, the court held the warrant invalid as an unconstitutional gen-
eral warrant because the check boxes allowed the police to bypass the particu-
larity requirement62 and search for items for which they had no probable 
cause.63  Following a reversal of the suppression order by Missouri’s Court of 
Appeals for the Western District,64 the Supreme Court of Missouri granted 
transfer.65  Holding that the instant warrant violated the Fourth Amendment as 
a general warrant, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s 
suppression of all evidence seized while executing the warrant.66 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Mapp v. Ohio,67 the Supreme Court of the United States established 
complete exclusion of evidence seized in the course of unconstitutional 
searches as the default rule at the state level.  The Mapp Court held “all evi-
dence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by 
that same authority, inadmissible in state court.”68  Since Mapp, this holding, 
known as the exclusionary rule, has softened to accommodate the need for ex-
ceptions and nuance in the doctrine.  Today, suppression of evidence is a “last 
resort, not a first impulse.”69  As an alternative to total exclusion, courts have 
widely adopted the severance doctrine in an effort to preserve legally obtained 
 
 60. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 188. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–60 
(2004).  Search warrants must describe with particularity the evidence to be seized; if 
a warrant fails to meet this requirement, it is unconstitutional as a general warrant.  
Ramirez, 540 U.S. at 557. 
 63. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 188. 
 64. State v. Douglass, No. WD 78328, 2016 WL 1212371, at *11 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2016), rev’d by 544 S.W.3d 182, cert. denied, 2019 WL 1231946 (U.S. Mar. 
18, 2019) (mem.).  The Western District’s decision is discussed in greater detail infra 
Section III.C.  
 65. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 189. 
 66. Id. at 199. 
 67. 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961).  Police searched Mapp’s home without produc-
ing any evidence of a search warrant.  Id. at 644–45.  The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search was inadmissible.  Id. 
at 655. 
 68. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. 
 69. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006). 
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evidence in cases where warrants were defective in part due to errors or mis-
conduct but were not entirely without merit.70 
In the past two decades, the Court has indicated that it prefers to reserve 
total exclusion for cases involving only the most serious police misconduct.  In 
Hudson v. Michigan,71 the Court held a “knock and announce” warrant viola-
tion insufficient to require suppression of evidence recovered under the war-
rant.  Refusing to invalidate the warrant, the Court noted that even if the pre-
liminary knock and announce “misstep” had not occurred, the police still would 
have been able to execute a warrant on the defendant’s home and would have 
recovered the contraband.72  The Court drew a notable distinction between the 
harm that occurs when errors or misconduct happen during the process of se-
curing or executing a warrant as opposed to the harm that occurs when law 
enforcement conduct entirely warrantless searches and seizures.73 
The Court has also refused to suppress evidence recovered under an ex-
pired warrant.  In Herring v. United States, police searched Herring’s vehicle 
and his person in reliance on a search warrant that had been recalled but was 
not properly recorded several months prior to the search.74  Due to a clerical 
error, the rescinded warrant remained on file with the county sheriff’s office 
beyond its expiration date and police relied upon its validity, finding metham-
phetamine and a gun in Herring’s possession.75  The Court noted that while 
exclusion may be appropriate where police misconduct flagrantly or deliber-
ately violated Fourth Amendment rights, the violations in Herring were not 
sufficiently reckless or intentional to justify exclusion.76  While the Court did 
not exclude the evidence recovered in Herring, its opinion indicated that more 
serious violations arising out of flaws in the warrant-keeping system, such as 
repeated violations leading to a “widespread pattern” of constitutional mis-
steps, could be cause for total exclusion.77 
 
 70. See United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting 
every federal court has “adopted the doctrine of severance, whereby valid portions of a 
warrant are severed from the invalid portions and only materials seized under the au-
thority of the valid portions, or lawfully seized while executing the valid portions, are 
admissible.”). 
 71. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 586.  Here, the Court held suppression of evidence recov-
ered while executing a warrant may not be appropriate even if police misconduct was 
the but-for cause of obtaining evidence.  Id. at 592. 
 72. Id. at 592. 
 73. Id. at 593.  Warrantless searches are the type of severe constitutional violation 
that require total exclusion because they violate citizens’ rights to shield their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects from government scrutiny until a valid warrant is issued.  
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 74. 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 146. 
 77. Id. at 146–47; see, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (noting it would not be reasonable for the police to rely on a recordkeep-
ing system “that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely 
leads to false arrests”). 
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A. Severability as an Alternative to Total Exclusion 
In cases involving partially defective warrants, many jurisdictions, in-
cluding Missouri, use some form of the severability test developed first by the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Naugle78 and 
more recently articulated in United States v. Sells.79  What is today known as 
the “Sells test” limits the availability of severance to cases in which “the valid 
portions of the warrant [are] sufficiently particularized, distinguishable from 
the invalid portions, and make up the greater part of the warrant.”80  The greater 
part requirement involves courts employing a “holistic test”81 that considers 
the “qualitative as well as the quantitative aspects of the valid portions of the 
warrant relative to the invalid portions to determine whether the valid portions 
‘make up the greater part of the warrant.’”82  In other words, the greater part 
requirement obliges courts to not only divide the warrant between its valid and 
invalid categories but also assign subjective weight to each category according 
to its scope and invasiveness relative to the warrant as a whole.83 
There does not seem to be a universal rule quantifying how much valid 
content in a warrant is required for courts to apply the severance doctrine as 
opposed to total exclusion.  As a result, courts have devised standards of vary-
ing rigor to determine when severance should be used to preserve categories of 
a partially defective warrant.84  Consequently, courts have split over the issue 
of whether severance should be applied as a default rule or only an exceptional 
remedy when an otherwise valid warrant contains only minor or superficial 
defects. 
B. Inconsistent Application of the Greater Part Requirement of the 
Sells Test 
While the Sells test has been generally met with approval in jurisdictions 
beyond the Tenth Circuit, courts have modified and customized the Sells test 
in their own severability analyses.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit may have implicitly adopted the greater part requirement of the sever-
ability test in its analysis by holding the analysis of a warrant’s contents to be 
 
 78. 997 F.2d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 79. 463 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 80. Sells, 463 F.3d at 1151 (alteration in original). 
 81. Id. at 1160. 
 82. Id. (quoting United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978) (approving severance of a 
partially defective warrant without a hearing when there is sufficient content to support 
a finding of probable cause after any false information is set to one side and not con-
sidered). 
10
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“both qualitative and quantitative.”85  In United States v. Jones,86 the Fourth 
Circuit cited the Sells greater part requirement as the standard in its review of 
the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized under a search warrant.  
However, the greater part requirement was ultimately not incorporated into the 
court’s analysis because all of the evidence found in the course of the search 
would have been admissible even if the allegedly defective categories of the 
warrant were severed.87 
Rather than apply the greater part requirement, other courts have taken an 
alternative approach to severance that examines each “valid part of a warrant 
without analyzing its relation to the whole.”88  In 2017, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan explicitly rejected the greater part require-
ment of the Sells test.89  Suggesting the greater part requirement of the Sells 
test may be “unsound,”90 the court reiterated its support for the severance doc-
trine as a default remedy by holding that “the appropriate remedy for over-
breadth is severing the infirm clause, and not dooming the entire warrant.”91  
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adopted the Sells 
severance test but rejected the greater part requirement.92 
The Sells opinion itself acknowledged that courts outside of the Tenth 
Circuit have generally incorporated the majority of the Naugle severability test 
into their analyses while modifying or rejecting the greater part requirement.93  
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held sever-
ance is “the normal remedy” for overbroad portions of a warrant unless the 
invalid portions “are not inseparable from or predominate over” the valid parts 
of a warrant. 94  It is not clear whether courts will reach qualitatively different 
results on the basis of a greater part requirement versus a predomination re-
quirement.  The distinction may be merely semantic.  However, the Sells 
greater part requirement implies courts should determine whether the valid 
parts of a warrant comprise more than fifty percent of the entire warrant.  In 
contrast, the question of whether invalid parts of a warrant “predominate” over 
 
 85. United States v. Jones, No. 3:17cr71, 2018 WL 935396, at *16 (E.D. Va. Feb. 
16, 2018). 
 86. Id. at *16. 
 87. Id. at *18. 
 88. Brief for Petitioner at 9, State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. 2018) (No. 
18-285), 2018 WL 4275880. 
 89. United States v. Walling, NO. 1:16-cr-250, 2017 WL 1313898, at *8–9 (W.D. 
Mich. Apr. 10, 2017). 
 90. United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 91. Walling, 2017 WL 1313898, at *6 (citing Greene, 250 F.3d at 477).  
 92. See United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 448–49 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding 
severance to be the remedy for a partially defective warrant unless the valid portion of 
the warrant in question is merely an insignificant or tangential part). 
 93. United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 94. United States v. Embry, 625 Fed. App’x 814, 817 (holding severability only 
would not apply where the “valid portion of the warrant is a relatively insignificant 
portion of an otherwise invalid search.”). 
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the whole seems to offer courts even more latitude to reach a preferred outcome 
than the greater part requirement of Sells. 
Perhaps the clearest criticism of the greater part requirement of the Sells 
test appeared in Cassady v. Goering,95 a case decided in 2009 by the Tenth 
Circuit.  In Cassady, Judge Michael W. McConnell wrote a dissent that noted 
the circuit split over the use of the greater part requirement and questioned 
whether the Naugle court intended to create the greater part requirement in the 
first place.96  In Judge McConnell’s view, the greater part requirement 
[d]eparts unnecessarily, and arguably accidentally, from the test em-
ployed in the vast majority of other jurisdictions . . . .  [T]he subjectivity 
inherent in applying “the greater part of the warrant” test leads to un-
predictable results . . . .  [T]he manner in which judges chop up a war-
rant will often have outcome-determinative effects.97 
According to the Cassady dissent, the greater part requirement appears to 
stem from an inaccurate citation in Sells’ predecessor Naugle to a Second Cir-
cuit case named United States v. George.98  The Naugle court cited George as 
authority for the following test: “[T]he valid portions of the warrant must be 
sufficiently particularized, distinguishable from the invalid portions, and make 
up the greater part of the warrant.”99  However, “the words, ‘greater part of the 
warrant’ appear nowhere in George.”100  Rather, George employed the major-
ity rule that severance is unavailable where “sufficiently particularized portions 
make up only an insignificant or tangential portion of the warrant.”101  Similar 
to the tension between a greater part requirement and the Ninth Circuit’s “pre-
domination” requirement, there may be a qualitative difference between how 
courts rule on suppression of a warrant under a greater part approach as op-
posed to an approach that requires the valid part of a warrant be more than 
“insignificant or tangential.” 
C. The Procedural History of Douglass 
Before Douglass reached the Supreme Court of Missouri, the circuit 
court’s total suppression of the warrant was reversed in favor of the prosecution 
at the appellate level.  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
reviewed the appeal under an abuse of discretion standard to determine whether 
 
 95. 567 F.3d 628 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 96. Id. at 657–58 (McConnell, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 657. 
 99. Id. at 637 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 
822 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 100. Id. at 657 (McConnell, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. (italics omitted) (quoting United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 
1992)). 
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severance should have been applied to the warrant.102  Writing for the majority 
in a six-to-five decision, Judge Karen King Mitchell overruled the circuit 
court’s exclusion of the Douglass warrant.103  Judge Mitchell wrote that “the 
circuit court was authorized to suppress only evidence that was actually seized 
in reliance on the corpse provision.”104  The majority stated it would not ex-
clude the valid parts of the warrant unless it could be determined on remand 
that the searching officers relied on the corpse clause.105  The majority opinion 
ultimately sparked two dissents, laying the groundwork for the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s reversal.106 
Judge Mitchell began her Sells analysis by dividing the warrant into ten 
categories: 
(1) bags and purses; (2) Toshiba laptop; (3) costume jewelry; (4) sun-
glasses; (5) identification for Melissa Garris; (6) identification for Gar-
ris’ son; (7) perfume and makeup related items; (8) keys unrelated to 
the scene; (9) other property readily and easily identifiable as stolen; 
and (10) deceased human fetus or corpse, or part thereof.107 
Douglass and Gaulter did not contest the validity of categories one 
through nine; the majority found only category ten invalid.108  Because each 
item in categories one through nine was “clearly related to the theft crimes the 
defendants were accused of committing,” the court found categories one 
through nine distinguishable from category ten.109 
In the next step of its analysis, the majority conducted its “greater part of 
the warrant” calculation.110  Comparing the valid versus invalid categories of 
the warrant, the court found categories one through nine to quantitatively and 
qualitatively outweigh category ten.111 
Finally, the court addressed the issue of officer misconduct in checking 
the corpse clause on the warrant form.112  For purposes of the severance doc-
trine, the court glossed over the issue of officer misconduct, stating that the 
relevant inquiry is if each part of a warrant is invalid, not why part of a warrant 
 
 102. State v. Douglass, No. WD 78328, 2016 WL 1212371, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Mar. 29, 2016), rev’d by State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 2019 WL 1231946 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019) (mem.).  The abuse of discretion stand-
ard only permits reversal if the circuit court’s decision was clearly erroneous.  Id. at *4. 
 103. Id. at *11. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at *11, *19. 
 107. Id. at *7. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at *8. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *9. 
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might be invalid.113  To the extent officer misconduct was relevant to invalid 
content appearing in a warrant, the greater part requirement permitted courts to 
factor misconduct into their qualitative analyses.114  The court noted that where 
officer misconduct was relevant to the warrant’s content, it could only “exclude 
. . . evidence seized as a result of misconduct and not any evidence seized under 
lawful authority.”115  Essentially, Judge Mitchell concluded the court could not 
exclude evidence seized under categories one through nine because categories 
one through nine were not impacted by misconduct.116  While Detective Estes’ 
conduct in securing the warrant was not excusable or justifiable, the majority 
concluded it could not invalidate the entire warrant without evidence that the 
searching officers relied on the invalid part of the warrant in conducting their 
search.117 
The first dissent, written by Judge Gary D. Witt, argued severability is 
unavailable in cases of bad-faith police misconduct.118  Judge Witt contested 
the majority’s contention that officer misconduct plays no independent role in 
determining whether severance can apply to a warrant.119  Under Judge Witt’s 
interpretation of the severance doctrine, severance becomes automatically un-
available in cases where the police acted in bad faith.120  He stated, “The ab-
sence of bad faith or pretext is necessary before redaction may be considered, 
as ignoring bad faith by the police or prosecution would undermine many of 
the purposes of the Warrant Clause . . . .”121  In Judge Witt’s view, deliberate 
deception in a warrant application fatally undermines the ability of judges to 
make informed decisions; in such circumstances, redaction cannot be an op-
tion.122 
Judge Witt was not convinced that total exclusion would be too harsh a 
remedy in Douglass.123  He believed the deterrent value of total exclusion 
would prevent future misconduct by police of the kind that took place in this 
case.124  Here, the police conduct was “sufficiently deliberate” that exclusion 
could meaningfully deter similar misconduct.125  Judge Witt supported his con-
clusion by opining that Detective Estes’ testimony suggested it is the regular 
practice of the Kansas City Police Department to unlawfully check inapplica-
ble probable cause boxes on their warrant forms.126  Because Detective Estes 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *10. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at *11. 
 118. Id. (Witt, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at *14. 
 120. Id. at *15. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at *17. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at *18 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)). 
 126. Id. 
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knew there was not probable cause to search for evidence of human corpses, 
Judge Witt concluded that the warrant was not executed in good faith and was 
a “deliberate circumvention of the . . . Fourth Amendment” such that evidence 
found pursuant to it was worthy of exclusion.127 
In a separate dissent, Judge Mark D. Pfeiffer articulated his belief that the 
authority to search provided by the corpse clause of the warrant was so broad 
that it “swallow[ed] everything else in the subject warrant.”128  Judge Pfeiffer 
reasoned that the corpse clause could have implicitly authorized police to con-
duct their search at the microscopic level, investigating fibers and conducting 
DNA tests on Douglass and Glauter’s home.129  In Judge Pfeiffer’s view, 
checking the corpse clause fundamentally changed the nature of the investiga-
tion from a property crime to a potential homicide.130  As such, the practical 
effect of the corpse clause was to create an unconstitutional general warrant for 
which exclusion is not possible.131 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri decided Douglass by a four-to-two 
vote.132  The reasoning of the majority and dissent most clearly diverges in two 
places.  First, the judges were unable to agree on the most logical way to divide 
the warrant.133  The Sells severance test grants broad discretion to courts to 
divide warrants as they see fit.  The majority divided the warrant into thirteen 
categories, while the dissent divided it into five categories.134  Second, the ma-
jority’s application of a holistic test found the warrant’s unsupported categories 
to be so broad that an unconstitutional general warrant was formed.135  In con-
trast, the dissenting judges believed the warrant’s valid categories could have 
been preserved by severing any parts not supported by probable cause.136  The 
judges were in agreement that Sells provides the correct severability test, alt-
hough they were unable to agree as to how it should be applied.137 
 
 127. Id. at *19. 
 128. Id. (Pfeiffer, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at *20. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Judge W. Brent Powell did not participate in the deciding of this case.  State 
v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 199 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 2019 WL 
1231946 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019) (mem.). 
 133. Id. at 191 (majority opinion) (stating the majority’s view on how the warrant 
should be divided); see also id. at 202 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (stating the dissent’s 
view on how the warrant should be divided). 
 134. Id. at 191 (majority opinion); id. at 202 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 195 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. at 208 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 190 (majority opinion) (stating the majority’s explanation of the Sells 
test); id. at 201 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (stating the dissent’s use of the Sells test). 
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A. The Majority 
In Douglass, the Supreme Court of Missouri first considered the State’s 
argument that the severance doctrine permits courts to sever invalid categories 
of warrants while retaining their constitutionally-sound categories “so long as 
the invalid portions can be meaningfully severed from the valid portions and 
have not created an impermissible general warrant.”138  Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Patricia Breckenridge employed the Tenth Circuit’s five-step Sells 
test to determine whether the severance doctrine applied to the instant war-
rant.139 
1. Step One 
In step one, the majority divided Detective Estes’ warrant into the follow-
ing thirteen categories: 
1. property, article, material or substance that constitutes evidence of 
the commission of a crime; 
2.  property that has been stolen or acquired in any manner declared an 
offense; 
3.  property for which possession is an offense under the laws of this 
state; 
4.  any person for whom a valid felony arrest warrant is outstanding; 
5.  deceased human fetus or corpse, or part thereof; 
6.  Coach, Prada, and Louis Vuitton bags; 
7.  Toshiba laptop; 
8.  vintage/costume jewelry, some with MG engraved; 
9.  Coach, Lv, Hermes, Bestie sunglasses; 
10.  passport, social security cards, and birth certificates for M.G. and 
her son; 
11.  perfume and makeup sets; 
12.  keys not belonging to property or vehicles at the scene; and 
 
 138. Id. at 190 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. 
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13.  any property readily and easily identifiable as stolen.140 
2. Step Two 
In step two of its analysis, the court identified categories one through 
three as reproductions of the language of Missouri’s probable cause statute.141  
The court noted the statute’s language described “broad, generic categories for 
which a search warrant may be issued.”142  The court found categories one 
through three defective because the statutory language “place[d] no limitations 
on the search and [was] devoid of any reference to the crimes related to [the 
victims].  No specificity as to the crime or property was provided in these first 
three categories.”143  Because the “statutory language of the first three catego-
ries d[id] not include any distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be 
seized,” they were found to “lack any particularity for the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.”144 
The State argued categories one through three of the warrant application 
were included for purposes of describing Garris’ stolen property using the stat-
ute’s general terms before specifically describing the stolen goods in categories 
six through thirteen.145  The majority rejected this argument, holding that cate-
gories one through three were not “limited by referencing any particular crim-
inal offense and certainly not limited by any reference to [Garris] or her stolen 
property.”146  In Sells, the use of a comparable “catch-all” category on a war-
rant form that permitted seizure of “‘any other related fruits, instrumentalities, 
and evidence of the crime’ was sufficiently particular” for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.147  In the majority’s view, the inclusion of the word “re-
lated” sufficiently narrowed the search to “enumerated provisions of the war-
rant” for which probable cause existed.148 
Next, the court rejected category four of the warrant.  Category four as-
serted there was probable cause to believe a person with an outstanding felony 
arrest warrant would be present at Douglass and Gaulter’s home at the time of 
 
 140. Id. at 191. 
 141. Id. at 192; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 542.271 (2016). 
 142. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 192. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 192. 
 147. Id. at 192–93 (quoting United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1157 (10th Cir. 
2006)); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976).  So-called “catchall” 
phrases have been challenged as creating unconstitutional general warrants when they 
were affixed to the end of sentences detailing evidence police anticipated finding during 
their searches.  Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479.  However, Andresen held valid catchall 
phrases are limited in scope to the specific, relevant, crime for which the warrant was 
authorized.  Id. at 480–81. 
 148. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 193. 
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the search.149  The court found the warrant’s supporting affidavit failed to ade-
quately support the statements in category four.150  The State conceded that 
“category five, the corpse clause, lack[ed] probable cause.”151 
The court agreed categories six through twelve were sufficiently specific 
to satisfy the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.152  Based on the list of stolen items provided in Detective Estes’ 
affidavit, “there was a fair probability such items would be found at Mr. 
Douglass and Ms. Gaulter’s residence.”153 
Finally, the majority deemed category thirteen an impermissible “catch-
all” provision that gave police broad authorization to search property without 
limitation to the suspected crime.154  The court held that where a catch-all cat-
egory failed to “limit the search in any fashion to the crime at issue,” it was 
improper.155  Further, if the catch-all category failed to limit a search beyond 
“items believed to be stolen,” the category was conclusory and “not descriptive 
at all.”156 
3. Step Three 
In step three, the majority determined that categories six through twelve 
were distinguishable from categories one through five and thirteen because 
each valid category “retain[ed] its significance when isolated from [the] rest of 
the warrant.”157  As a result, the court decided categories six through twelve 
could be eligible for severance.158 
4. Step Four 
In step four, the majority balanced the parts of the warrant to determine 
whether the valid categories outweighed the invalid categories.159  This step 
required the court to consider the number of valid versus invalid categories 
while weighing the “practical effect” of each provision.160  The court attempted 
to “employ a holistic test that examine[d] the qualitative as well as the quanti-
tative aspects of the valid portions of the warrant relative to the invalid portions 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 193–94. 
 152. Id. at 194. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 194–95. 
 160. Id. at 195. 
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to determine whether the valid portions ma[d]e up the greater part of the war-
rant.”161  In performing its “holistic test,” the majority concluded that, while 
the valid categories of the warrant were greater in number than the invalid cat-
egories, the invalid categories were sufficiently defective to turn the warrant 
into an unconstitutional general warrant for which severance was inapplica-
ble.162 
Judge Breckenridge stated the applicability of the severance doctrine did 
not turn on what items were actually seized in the search.163  In fact, the sever-
ance doctrine focused only on the merits of the warrant, “not what items were 
actually seized pursuant to it.”164  Finally, Judge Breckenridge noted that De-
tective Estes’ affidavit in support of the warrant could not cure its defects be-
cause there was no evidence the affidavit accompanied the warrant at the time 
of the search.165 
5. Step Five 
The court held the warrant was a general warrant in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.166  As a result, severance could not be applied and “all evidence 
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution . . . [was] 
inadmissible in state court.”167 
B. The Dissent 
Chief Justice Fischer authored the dissent in Douglass and was joined by 
Judge Wilson.168  Chief Justice Fischer began his analysis by comparing the 
language in the search warrant to Detective Estes’ supporting affidavit.169  
Fischer noted that every warrant application form has check boxes for five cat-
egories of evidence that may be searched for in a warrant.170  Those categories 
“track the language contained in [section] 542.271” of the Missouri Revised 
Statutes.171 
Judge Fischer stated that 
preceding the five categories was an express reference to the application 
for the search warrant, which provided, “Based on information provided 
 
 161. Id. (quoting United States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1160 (2006)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 195–96. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 196. 
 166. Id. at 198. 
 167. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 
(Mo. 2011)). 
 168. Id. at 199 (Fischer, C.J., dissenting). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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in a verified application/affidavit, the Court finds probable cause to 
warrant a search for and/or seizure of the following[.]” Then, the five 
specific categories were listed as follows: 
• Property, article, material or substance that constitutes evidence of the 
commission of a crime; 
• Property that has been stolen or acquired in any manner declared an 
offense; 
• Property for which possession is an offense under the laws of this 
state; 
• Any person for whom a valid felony arrest warrant is outstanding; 
• Deceased human fetus or corpse, or part thereof.172 
Chief Justice Fischer agreed with the majority that the circuit judge erred 
in permitting the warrant’s check box for “deceased human fetus or corpse, or 
part thereof” to be checked.173  However, he found the improperly checked box 
not to be fatal to the warrant because the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled the exclusionary rule’s application was “an issue separate from the ques-
tion [of] whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke 
the rule were violated by police conduct.”174 
Chief Justice Fischer noted that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has “never held that potential, 
as opposed to actual invasions of privacy constitute searches for the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”  And, “[n]ot every Fourth 
Amendment violation results in the exclusion of the evidence obtained 
pursuant to a defective search warrant.”175 
He echoed the First Circuit’s concern in United States v. Riggs that “a rule 
requiring blanket invalidation of overbroad warrants would seem ill ad-
vised.”176  Before invalidating a warrant, Chief Justice Fischer argued courts 
must “weigh[] the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s 
case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance 
on a search warrant . . . that is ultimately found to be [partially] defective.”177 
 
 172. Id. (alteration in original). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984)). 
 175. Id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) and United States 
v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 176. Id. at 200 (quoting United States v. Riggs, 690 F.2d 298, 301 (1st Cir. 1982)). 
 177. Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). 
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In this case, it was undisputed that probable cause existed to search for 
the items specifically identified in the warrant, and it was undisputed that their 
description met the particularity requirement.178  Applying the Sells severance 
test, 
[t]he infirmity of part of a warrant requires the suppression of evidence 
seized pursuant to that part of the warrant, but does not require the sup-
pression of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant (or 
lawfully seized – on plain view grounds, for example – during . . .  ex-
ecution [of the valid portions]).179 
While the majority broke the warrant into thirteen categories, Chief Jus-
tice Fischer divided it into five categories of evidence listed on the warrant: 
(1) “Property, article, material or substance that constitutes evidence of 
the commission of a crime;” (2) “Property that has been stolen or ac-
quired in any manner declared an offense;” (3) “Property for which pos-
session is an offense under the laws of this state;” (4) “Any person for 
whom a valid felony arrest warrant is outstanding;” and (5) “Deceased 
human fetus or corpse, or part thereof.”180 
Under Chief Justice Fischer’s method of subdivision, the only category 
of evidence properly challenged by Gaulter and Douglass was category five.181  
According to Chief Justice Fischer, “The other four checked categories, which 
are found on every form search warrant, d[id] not violate the particularity re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment because the search warrant expressly re-
ferred back to the application for the search warrant . . . .”182 
Chief Justice Fischer found that the warrant’s particularity requirement 
was met through Detective Estes’ supporting affidavit because the warrant 
form incorporated the affidavit in the following clause: “Based on information 
provided in a verified application/affidavit, the Court finds probable cause to 
warrant a search for and/or seizure of the following.”183  Chief Justice Fischer 
stated that because warrants are permitted to meet the Fourth Amendment par-
ticularity requirement through the incorporation of other documents, the gen-
erality expressed in the check boxes were not fatal to the warrant.184 
Chief Justice Fischer suggested if warrants could not incorporate other 
documents by reference, the effect would be to “completely eliminate form 
 
 178. Id. at 200–01. 
 179. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States. v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 
1150 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 180. Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (alteration in original). 
 184. Id. at 203. 
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warrants in general.”185  Because the language of the warrant tracked the lan-
guage provided by statute,186 Chief Justice Fischer believed invalidating the 
warrant on the basis of the language in the check boxes would “call into ques-
tion the constitutional validity of [section] 542.271, which this court prefers to 
avoid completely.”187  Instead, Chief Justice Fischer suggested that the war-
rant’s particularity requirement was met by the “explicit list of items to be 
seized” provided in Detective Estes’ affidavit, which the issuing judge signed 
at the same time as the warrant itself.188 
Based on Chief Justice Fischer’s conclusion that the check boxes did not 
constitute a constitutional violation, he found the only defective category of the 
warrant to be the corpse clause.189  Because severance was available “[w]here 
. . . each of the categories of items to be seized describes distinct subject matter 
in language not linked to language of other categories, and each valid category 
retains its significance when isolated from the rest of the warrant . . . ,”190 Chief 
Justice Fisher found the corpse clause distinct and isolated from every other 
category of the warrant.191 
Applying the Sells test’s “qualitative and quantitative assessments”192 of 
the warrant’s fitness for severability, Chief Justice Fischer found the corpse 
clause distinguishable from the remainder of the warrant.193  Quantitatively, 
the corpse clause was outweighed four-to-one by categories supported by prob-
able cause.194  Qualitatively, Chief Justice Fischer considered the corpse clause 
a “de minimis aspect of the warrant.”195  While “an officer could not properly 
look for a stolen flat-screen television by rummaging through a suspect’s med-
icine cabinet,”196 the corpse clause did not impact the scope of the officers’ 
search because “a search for small parts of a corpse is unlikely to be broader 
than a search for small items like jewelry, keys, or identification.”197 
Chief Justice Fischer next addressed possible remedies for warrants con-
taining categories unsupported by probable cause.  He noted the Supreme Court 
of the United States’ decision in Franks v. Delaware that if an officer makes 
factual misrepresentations in a warrant, the court must “redact the misrepre-
sentation and then reevaluate whether the search warrant is still supported by 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. MO. REV. STAT. § 542.271.1 (2016). 
 187. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 203; see State v. Wade, 421 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc) (holding statutes are presumed constitutional and will only be held 
unconstitutional if they clearly contravene a constitutional provision). 
 188. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 204. 
 189. Id. 
 190. United States. v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1158 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 191. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 204. 
 192. Sells, 463 F.3d at 1160. 
 193. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 205. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 205–06. 
 196. Id. at 205 (quoting United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 450 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
 197. Id. 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/12
2019] MISSOURI'S WARRANT SUPPRESSION STANDARD 603 
probable cause.”198  Citing United States v. Christine, Chief Justice Fischer 
noted that even where police expand their searches beyond the valid scope of 
their warrants, “only that evidence which was seized illegally must be sup-
pressed; the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant has always been admit-
ted.”199  Essentially, “courts exclude only that evidence seized as a result of 
misconduct and not any evidence seized under lawful authority.”200 
In Chief Justice Fischer’s view, the inappropriately checked corpse clause 
on Detective Estes’ warrant form more closely resembled an inadvertent error 
than an intentional misrepresentation.201  According to Chief Justice Fischer, 
Detective Estes’ improperly checked box on the warrant form did not justify 
invalidating the entire warrant because courts have rejected complete exclusion 
even in cases where police relied on their own intentional misrepresentations 
to secure search warrants.202  He suggested the goals of the Fourth Amendment 
could be met by only suppressing evidence seized in reliance on the invalid 
corpse clause because “the Supreme Court [of the United States] has ‘never 
held that potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of privacy constitute 
searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.’”203 
Chief Justice Fischer reasoned that if the officers did not rely on the 
corpse of the warrant, then it did not expand the warrant’s intrusion on 
Douglass and Gaulter’s privacy.204  If the corpse clause did not expand the 
warrant’s intrusion on Douglass and Gaulter’s privacy, then no Fourth Amend-
ment violation took place.205  Therefore, because none of the evidence seized 
was taken in reliance on the invalid portion of the warrant, severing only the 
corpse clause would allow Douglass and Gaulter to receive a fair trial without 
damaging the state’s ability to present its case.206  Partial severance would, in 
Chief Justice Fischer’s view, “plac[e] the State and the accused in the same 
positions they would have been had the impermissible conduct not taken 
place.”207 
 
 198. Id. at 208 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978)). 
 199. Id. (quoting United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 757 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.  See generally Rosemarie A. Lynskey, A Middle Ground Approach to the 
Exclusionary Remedy: Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 811 (1988).  Lynskey noted, “[E]ven if the court were to find that the 
officer recklessly or intentionally included falsehoods in the affidavit, redaction still 
would be appropriate to excise only those clauses authorized pursuant to the misinfor-
mation, provided that the warrant generally is based on truth.”  Id. at 837. 
 203. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 209 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
712 (1984)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984)). 
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Chief Justice Fischer concluded that the circuit court improperly applied 
total suppression of the search warrant as its “first impulse, not its last re-
sort.”208  He stated that total suppression’s role as a remedy should be limited 
as an option of last resort because “suppress[ing] the truth and set[ting] the 
criminal loose in the community without punishment” carries a heavy cost, 
particularly for victims.209 
V. COMMENT 
The turning point of Douglass may have been step four of the Sells test, 
where the Supreme Court of Missouri was tasked with “[d]etermin[ing] 
[w]hether the [v]alid or [i]nvalid [p]ortions [m]ake up the [g]reater [p]art of the 
[w]arrant.”210  In Sells, the Tenth Circuit considered the “practical effect” of 
each category of a search warrant as it related to other categories.211  The court 
found that counting the number of valid versus invalid categories of warrants 
was an unhelpful “hypertechnical” approach because some “invalid portions . 
. . may be so broad and invasive that they contaminate the whole warrant.”212  
Instead, applying a “holistic test” allowed the court to assess the relative value 
and influence of each category of a warrant relative to the whole.213 
The Sells approach to severance analysis offers a level of judicial discre-
tion that can lead to inconsistent results from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, case 
to case, and judge to judge.214  Holistic tests offer cover for courts to effectively 
disregard the “quantitative” portion of the greater part requirement when it 
yields a result contradictory to the result of the holistic test.215  In effect, if the 
valid categories of a warrant outnumber the invalid categories, courts have con-
siderable leeway in deciding whether or not to apply severance.  For instance, 
a court may assign higher qualitative values to each invalid category, erasing 
the numerical advantage held by the valid categories.  Conversely, courts can 
just as easily reach the opposite result and apply severance by holding the nu-
merically greater invalid portions of a warrant de minimis.  As Douglass 
demonstrates, the objectivity of the greater part requirement contributes little, 
if anything, to courts’ decisions in light of the subjective nature of the test. 
 
 208. Id. at 210. 
 209. Id. at 210 (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011)). 
 210. Id. at 194–95 (majority opinion). 
 211. United States. v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1160 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See, e.g., Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 656–57 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 215. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d at 195. 
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Because the greater part requirement contributes to inconsistency in 
Fourth Amendment search warrant cases, the First Circuit,216 Second Cir-
cuit,217 Third Circuit,218 Fifth Circuit,219 Sixth Circuit,220 and Ninth Circuit221 
do not apply a holistic test in their severance decisions.  Instead, the courts 
prefer to “carve out”222 any constitutionally defective parts of warrants while 
allowing the case to be decided on its merits. 
The most effective way to resolve the conflict over how much of a warrant 
constitutes the greater part may be for courts to adopt the test as it exists in 
several circuits already by rejecting the holistic component of the test entirely.  
If courts can avoid conflict over the qualitative value of each category of a 
warrant relative to other categories, the question of whether the valid portion 
can stand alone becomes not only easier to resolve but also more consistent in 
the application of severance. 
The problems that the Cassady dissent predicted would be caused by the 
Sells holistic test were on full display in Douglass.  In this case, the Missouri 
courts could not even agree on how many categories the search warrant should 
be divided into.  At the appellate level, the court divided the warrant into ten 
categories.  At the Supreme Court of Missouri, the majority and dissent found 
common ground by rejecting the ten-category division; however, the majority 
divided the warrant into thirteen categories while the dissent opted for five. 
The court’s repeated “chopping” of the Douglass warrant rendered the 
greater part requirement of the Sells test virtually useless because the judges 
could not agree on how they should group categories of the warrant.  There 
were essentially three separate and distinguishable holistic tests of the same 
warrant between the Western District and the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
majority and dissent.  Under the Western District’s quantitative analysis, ninety 
percent of the warrant was valid.  In contrast, according to the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s majority’s quantitative analysis, only fifty-four percent of that 
same warrant was valid.  Finding a middle ground, Chief Justice Fischer’s 
 
 216. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 682 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[A] warrant is 
valid as to some items but not as to others, we have established that a court can admit 
the former while excluding the latter.”). 
 217. United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 449 (2d Cir. 2013) (declining to use 
severance only when the valid part of a warrant is “insignificant or tangential.”). 
 218. United States v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 758 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding courts 
should salvage partially invalid warrants by redacting categories unsupported by prob-
able cause). 
 219. United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (declining to sever 
where the warrant was generally invalid except for a tangentially related category). 
 220. United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[I]nfirmity due 
to overbreadth does not doom the entire warrant; rather it requires suppression of evi-
dence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant . . . , but does not require suppression 
of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant . . . .” (quotation omitted)). 
 221. United States v. Embry, 625 F. App’x 814, 817 (9th Cir. 2015) (permitting 
severance unless the valid portion of a warrant “is a relatively insignificant part of an 
otherwise invalid search”). 
 222. Galpin, 720 F.2d at 448. 
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quantitative analysis found the warrant eighty percent valid.  This disconnect 
is key because the quantitative step of the test influences the judges’ perspec-
tives for the qualitative step: It seems plausible that a quantitatively fifty-four 
percent valid warrant is in more danger of invalidation than one that is eighty 
or ninety percent quantitatively valid.  Judge McConnell was prescient in his 
prediction that permitting courts to “chop up”223 warrants as they please and 
apply a subjective holistic test to the result would be an outcome-determinative 
endeavor. 
If the Supreme Court of Missouri had approached the warrant in Douglass 
with the goal of redacting invalid categories and keeping the rest, Douglass 
could have been decided on its merits.  Neither the majority nor dissent dis-
puted whether categories six through twelve of the majority’s division method 
were supported by probable cause.  Similarly, the court was in consensus that 
the category of the warrant referring to human corpses was not supported by 
probable cause.  To resolve any debate about the validity of the statutory lan-
guage or whether probable cause existed for the arrest of “[a]ny person for 
whom a valid felony arrest warrant [wa]s outstanding,”224 the court could have 
simply redacted the disputed language without prejudicing the case for the 
State or Douglass and Glauter.  Instead, total suppression effectively foreclosed 
Douglass and Glauter from being prosecuted for their crimes. 
The impact of Douglass may be directly felt by law enforcement agen-
cies.  In Douglass, the investigating detective used a fillable warrant form with 
check boxes that echoed Missouri’s probable cause statute.225  Specific details 
about the crimes to be investigated were provided in a supplemental affida-
vit.226  The majority’s decision to include the statute’s language in its quantita-
tive analysis of the warrant and subsequent conclusion that the language was 
insufficiently particular may signal the court’s disapproval of warrant forms 
with check boxes or even fillable warrant forms in general. 
In light of the fact that there is no law enforcement convenience exception 
to constitutional warrant requirements, police departments should consider 
reevaluating whether their forms are too convenient to withstand scrutiny.  
Some appropriate corrective steps may be for police departments to (1) con-
sider removing check boxes from essential categories of warrant applications 
and (2) allocate additional police training, time, and resources to ensuring po-
lice understand the importance of proper warrant application procedures. 
Removing check boxes and requiring police to write out their probable 
cause statements may deter officers from inaccurately asserting or overstating 
the existence of probable cause in the future.  Additionally, the perception that 
 
 223. Cassady v. Goering, 567 F.3d 628, 657 (10th Cir. 2009) (McConnell, C.J., 
dissenting).  See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 224. State v. Douglass, 544 S.W.3d 182, 190 (Mo. 2018) (en banc), cert. denied, 
2019 WL 1231946 (U.S. Mar. 18, 2019) (mem.). 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id. at 187–88. 
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police can secure warrants by simply checking a few boxes may erode public 
confidence in the warrant application process. 
Here, Detective Estes testified he was unaware an additional warrant 
would not have been necessary if the police found human remains in the course 
of their search.  As a twenty-year police force veteran, Detective Estes’ state-
ments suggest the Kansas City Police Department may not have properly 
trained its officers on the purpose and necessary components of valid search 
warrants.227  To reduce the risk of future warrants being found unconstitutional, 
law enforcement agencies may consider supplementing their officers’ training 
and removing check boxes from warrant forms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The inherent subjectivity of the Sells test contributes to unpredictable and 
arguably inconsistent results from case to case.  The root of the problem is the 
test’s failure to place clear boundaries on its holistic, greater part requirement.  
It is unsurprising that a test requiring courts to divide warrants into subjective 
categories and then apply holistic weight to those categories contributes to 
highly variable outcomes.  The fact that the majority and the dissent in both the 
Western District’s and the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinions divided the 
Douglass warrant differently indicates that the test is fundamentally too impre-
cise to work properly. 
The present iteration of the Sells test needs revision because its applica-
tion yields wildly dissimilar results from judge to judge.  In Douglass, one set 
of facts led to (1) total suppression of the warrant at the circuit court level; (2) 
a six-to-five reversal of the suppression by the Western District with two sep-
arate dissents; and (3) a four-to-two reversal of the Western District by the 
Supreme Court of Missouri accompanied by Chief Justice Fischer’s dissent. 
Beyond the issues with the Sells test in Missouri, the Sells test is incon-
sistently applied in federal and state courts across the country.  Some courts 
apply the greater part requirement.  Other courts apply their own variations, 
opting for the predomination requirement.  Yet another subset of courts opt to 
redact any invalid parts of a warrant while leaving the rest intact. 
While Sells’ flexibility can be a valuable tool for courts to hold law en-
forcement to a high standard of quality in their warrant applications, that flex-
ibility impairs the consistent application of severance principles from judge to 
judge and case to case.  The Supreme Court of the United States’ denial of 
certiorari leaves the severance question unresolved and solidifies the validity 







 227. Id. at 187. 
27
Sanders: Reconsidering Missouri’s Warrant Suppression Standard
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss2/12
